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philosophy and economics 
 
The literature on philosophy and economics has traditionally been divided into 
two areas: economic methodology, which connects economics and 
epistemology/philosophy of science, and the literature on economics and moral 
philosophy/ethics. Recent developments in both of these areas are discussed in 
detail.  
 
The essential interdependency of philosophical and economic ideas was a prominent 
feature of classical economics. Adam Smith was the author of The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments as well as Wealth of Nations. John Stuart Mill was an extremely wide-ranging 
scholar, as well known as the author of A System of Logic as of The Principles of 
Political Economy. And of course Karl Marx’s Capital also drew on intellectual 
resources from economics, philosophy and a number of other fields. Classical political 
economy was deeply influenced by philosophy – different philosophies for different 
economists, but influenced nonetheless – and ideas also flowed freely in the opposite 
direction: from political economy to various areas of philosophical inquiry.  
 This changed significantly in the first third of the 20th century. The abandonment 
of ‘political economy’ and the self-conscious development of ‘scientific economics’ 
coincided with a major change in the relationship between the two disciplines. Although 
philosophy never completely disappeared from economic theorizing, it systematically 
came to play a less and less obvious role. There are undoubtedly many reasons for this. 
Two of the more important include the overall professionalization of disciplinary 
economics and the general acceptance of a more narrow, positivist-inspired notion of 
legitimate ‘scientific’ inquiry. John Stuart Mill directed his arguments at the general 
educated public and wrote confidently about the ‘moral sciences’; by the first half of the 
20th century fewer economists were doing the former and almost no professional 
economist would be comfortable doing the latter.  
 Although there were different versions of positivism, one common theme was that 
‘meaningful’ discourse comes in only two forms: the synthetic knowledge of empirical 
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science and the analytic knowledge of logic and mathematics. During the period of 
positivist dominance (roughly from the early 1930s through the 1950s), many, perhaps 
most, of the lines of inquiry that had previously travelled under the label of ‘philosophy’ 
– including, ethics, ontology, metaphysics, and aesthetics – were dismissed from the 
realm of meaningful discourse. Science ceased to be a generic category that included any 
rational, non-faith-based inquiry, and instead came to designate only the natural sciences 
(or modes of inquiry that follow the same scientific method). Economics clearly had 
scientific aspirations, and in such a regime fulfilling those aspirations required jettisoning 
the profession’s old philosophical ways. Many of the significant developments in 
economic theory during the first half of the 20th century can be understood in precisely 
these terms: as an attempt to systematically discard the old metaphysical and utilitarian 
baggage, and replace it with more appropriate scientific concepts. Moral philosophy, for 
example, might still make an appearance in discussions about economic theory, but it 
almost always played a disparaging role: either to indict another theory for retaining 
some ethical residuum, or to emphasize that one’s own theory was entirely free of such 
normative influences. Such an environment was certainly not conducive to forging new 
links between philosophy and economics, and for much of the 20th century very few 
were. 
 A particularly good example of the rejection of philosophy is the development of 
welfare economics during the second quarter of the 20th century. From the hedonism of 
many early neoclassicals to the so-called ‘material welfare school’ (Cooter and 
Rappoport, 1984) of Alfred Marshall and Arthur Pigou, welfare economics (and applied 
microeconomics in general) had traditionally been associated with utilitarianism: policy 
A was better than policy B if A increased total utility by more than B. During the 1930s, 
as a result of the work of Lionel Robbins (1952) and others, most economists came to 
view this type of ‘interpersonal’ utility comparison as unscientific and thus inappropriate 
for economic analysis. Moral values were simply raw, subjective or ‘emotive’ 
preferences that were not amenable to scientific analysis, and must therefore be kept out 
of economic science. 
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 As economists moved away from the earlier utilitarian notions of ‘good’ 
economic policy, they increasingly turned to the Pareto criterion as an alternative 
evaluative standard. It was argued (and still is) that Pareto efficiency – an allocation of 
resources such that no one person can be made better off without making someone else 
worse off – does not require making interpersonal utility comparisons and is therefore an 
entirely appropriate standard for scientific economics. The most important theoretical 
results of modern welfare economics – the first and second fundamental theorems – are 
based on a direct application of the Pareto criterion to questions about the welfare 
implications of competitive equilibrium. Although the norm-free credentials of Pareto 
efficiency have repeatedly been challenged (Blaug, 1980; Hausman and McPherson, 
2006; Robertson, 1952), the standard interpretation among practising economists remains 
that such judgements, and thus any policy recommendations based on them, are 
fundamentally value free. But it is not necessary to take sides in the debate over whether 
Pareto efficiency is or is not an ethical criterion in order to recognize that the entire 
discussion is couched in terms of whether moral concepts are properly kept out of 
economic science, and to note that such a discussion does not provide a very fertile 
environment for the cultivation of new relationships between economics and moral 
philosophy.     
 Economic methodology has traditionally been the one exception to economists’ 
general rejection of philosophy. Although ethics and metaphysics were shunned by 
economists, epistemology and philosophy of science were often consulted for guidance 
regarding the proper scientific method. This said, even within methodology the use of 
philosophical resources varied greatly from economist to economist. Some of the 
classical works in economic methodology (Milton Friedman, 1953, for example) hardly 
mentioned philosophy at all; others (Robbins, 1952, and Hutchison, 1938, for example) 
drew on selected aspects of the philosophy of science, while still others (Blaug, 1980; 
Samuelson, 1963) tried to apply the arguments of particular philosophers of natural 
science directly to economics. Thus, even in methodology economists focused on only a 
relatively small portion of the philosophical literature and employed even those resources 
in a less than systematic way. 
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 Although the traditional methodological literature is both extensive and ongoing, 
it is not the focus of the following discussion. There are at least two reasons for this. 
First, this literature has been effectively surveyed in a number of contemporary works 
(Blaug, 1980; Caldwell, 1994; Hands, 2001; Hausman, 1992) and second, things have 
again changed. Since the mid-1980s there has been a renaissance in the interaction 
between economics and philosophy. The traditional approach to economic methodology 
continues to produce viable research, but economics and philosophy are also interacting 
in many other, new and important ways. Philosophy of natural science is no longer the 
only relevant set of philosophical ideas – ethics and ontology have both returned to the 
scene – and the intellectual dynamic is now one of bilateral exchange rather than 
economists simply borrowing ideas from one corner of the philosophical shelf.  
 In addition to the revival of the interplay between economics and philosophy there 
has been an increase in the traffic between economics and a number of other fields that 
compete for some of the same intellectual space that philosophy has traditionally 
occupied. For example, resources from the sociology of science and science studies 
(Mirowski, 2002; Sent, 1998; Weintraub, 2002; Yonay, 1998), the rhetoric of science 
(McCloskey, 1998), postmodernism (Ruccio and Amariglio, 2003), feminism (Ferber and 
Nelson, 2003; Nelson, 1996), and variety of other fields have provided new tools for the 
examination of (and often confrontation with) modern economic theory. Although these 
works frequently overlap with the literature on philosophy and economics, they also 
involve ideas sufficiently removed from disciplinary philosophy that they fall outside of 
the work considered here. 
 The discussion is divided into two parts; the first examines recent developments 
in the relationship between economics and scientific philosophy. Some of this work has 
much in common with traditional economic methodology, while other contributions 
approach the relationship in entirely new ways. In the interest of brevity, only five of the 
many possible areas of significant research are examined. The second section examines 
the recent literature that combines economics and moral philosophy. Ethical questions are 
again back on the table, and an extensive literature has grown up relating various issues 
in moral philosophy to developments within economic theory. Some of this research 
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challenges the received view of the relationship between economics and ethics 
established during the first half of the 20th century, while other parts of the literature 
develop totally new connections. Again, as with the methodological literature, only a few 
examples are discussed. The final section briefly considers some points of convergence 
between contemporary work on economics and epistemology and that on economics and 
ethics. Throughout the discussion, the emphasis is on microeconomics and rational 
choice theory (rather than, say, macroeconomics or econometrics). 
 
Economics, epistemology, and philosophy of science 
The first area of research to be examined goes back to Terence Hutchison (1938); it is the 
literature relating the philosophical ideas of Karl Popper (1965; 1968) to economics. 
Popper is best known as an advocate of falsificationism, a philosophy that has two main 
theses: one demarcating science from non-science and the other characterizing the growth 
of scientific knowledge. For a theory to be scientific it must be at least potentially 
falsifiable by empirical evidence (in Popperian language, be falsifiable by at least one 
empirical basic statement). Scientific knowledge grows as the scientific community 
rejects falsified theories and retains those that have survived attempted falsifications (that 
is, by ‘bold conjecture and severe test’). The body of accepted science at any point in 
time consists of all scientific theories that have survived such severe empirical tests. 
Elements of such a methodology were present in Hutchison (1938), and elaborated in 
more detail in his later work. The position has been most articulately defended in the 
methodological writings of Mark Blaug (1980). Although many economists continue to 
endorse a falsificationist approach to methodological questions, there is also an extensive 
critical literature on the subject (Caldwell, 1991; 1994; Hands, 1993; Hausman, 1988; 
1992). 
 If the only research connecting the Popperian tradition to economics was the 
literature on falsificationism, then the subject would probably not be included in this 
discussion of recent developments. But that is not the case. During the last few decades 
the Popperian tradition has engaged economics on a number of different fronts, and 
currently consists of much more than just the literature defending (or criticizing) 
 
 6
falsificationism (Caldwell, 1991). At least three other developments should be noted. The 
first involves Popper’s own brief discussion of economic methodology (Popper, 1994). 
This work is controversial because Popper’s statements about economics – and social 
science more generally – differ from what he said about the (falsificationist) methodology 
of natural science. The second concerns the so-called ‘critical rationalist’ interpretation of 
Popper’s overall philosophical programme: an interpretation that goes back in the 
economics literature to Kurt Klappholz and Joseph Agassi (1959), but has its best 
contemporary representation in the work of Lawrence Boland (1997). Supporters of 
critical rationalism argue that Popper’s main philosophical contribution was not 
(empirical) falsificationism but rather a more general view of the growth of knowledge 
through open debate and rational criticism – of which falsification by empirical evidence 
is simply one, albeit a very important, special case. Although the discussion of critical 
rationalism has remained primarily an in-house debate among Popperians, it has much 
broader implications because it opens the door to characterizing the growth of knowledge 
as a product of particular social institutions rather than as the result of following fixed 
methodological rules, a view that has become increasingly important in general 
philosophy of science. Finally, there has been an extensive discussion of the work of 
Popper’s student Imre Lakatos (1970) and his ‘methodology of scientific research 
programs’ (Backhouse, 1997; Blaug and De Marchi, 1991; Latsis, 1976). Economists 
have focused on two different aspects of Lakatos’s work: his historical framework for 
understanding the evolution of economic research programmes (his concepts of hard 
core, protective belt, and so on) and his specific methodological framework for 
appraising scientific research programmes as progressive or degenerating. Even though 
there exists a critical literature on both of these issues, the Lakatosian framework has 
produced important case studies and also encouraged a re-examination of the general 
relationship between economic methodology and the history of economic thought. 
 The second area to consider involves the revival of interest in ontology and 
metaphysics in the philosophy of economics. There now exists a burgeoning literature on 
‘economics and ontology’ (Mäki, 2001), something that would have been next-to-
impossible only a few decades ago. During the heyday of positivism any mention of such 
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(occult) notions as essential natures, underlying causal powers, or ontological necessity 
all but disappeared from academic discussions about economics. Ontological discussion 
continued to some extent within certain heterodox, particularly Marxist, research 
programmes, but among mainstream economists, even philosophically informed ones, 
such concepts had no place in professional discourse. Although many things have 
contributed to this revival, three issues seem to be particularly important. 
 One factor contributing to this ontological renewal has clearly been the 
development of the ‘critical realist’ research programme, an anti-empiricist approach to 
the philosophy of social science that focuses on uncovering the hidden underlying causal 
mechanisms at work in social life. The most prolific defender of critical realism within 
economics has been Tony Lawson (2003), and his writings have generated an extensive 
secondary literature. A second factor involves changes that have taken place within the 
philosophy of natural science. Although there were many reasons for the decline of 
positivist-inspired philosophy of science, one of the most important was the perception 
that serious problems had developed within the Humean-inspired ‘empiricist’ component 
of the programme. Although debate continues about whether the founders of positivism 
were actually as empiricist as the standard view suggests (Michael Friedman, 1999), it is 
certainly clear that the programme was perceived that way by both critics and supporters, 
and that it was this aspect of the programme that was most effectively targeted by the 
criticism that descended upon it in the last quarter of the 20th century. Some of the efforts 
to reconfigure our reigning philosophical conceptions in light of these developments – 
particularly about scientific laws (Cartwright, 1989) and causality (Hoover, 2001) – draw 
directly on insights from economics. Finally, the literature on economics and ontology 
has benefited from recent changes that have taken place within the discipline of 
economics itself. A discipline that is more willing to entertain theoretical pluralism is 
more likely to be willing to entertain philosophical, even ontological, pluralism as well. 
The bottom line is that ontology and metaphysics are back and they are opening up a 
number of new (and renewed) lines of inquiry relevant to the philosophy of economics. 
 The third set of changes to consider involves border crossings between economics 
and certain other scientific fields – cognitive science, neuroscience, and related 
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disciplines – that have influenced the recent literature on the philosophy of mind. This 
literature is relatively new and rapidly growing, so much so that no appellative 
convention has emerged. Until such a consensus has been reached it is perhaps best to be 
inclusive and simply call it the literature on ‘the mind, the brain, rationality, agency and 
economics’. Examples would include such disparate works as Davis (2003), Glimcher 
(2003), Mirowski (2002), and Ross (2005). Although the arguments of the various 
contributors are quite different, there is some agreement about the main issues, as well as 
about the requirements for any adequate approach to these issues. These requirements 
concern consistency with recent developments in fields such as cognitive science, 
neurophysiology and artificial intelligence. The common concern is the core rational 
choice framework of modern economics: explaining economic behaviour as the outcome 
of rational constrained optimization of well-ordered preferences. Consumer choice theory 
is the paradigm case of such an explanatory strategy, but it is standard throughout 
economics (traditionally microeconomics, but increasingly macroeconomics as well).  
 Such rational choice explanations have recently been subject to a variety of 
criticisms. Some of these relate to the abundance of contrary empirical evidence that has 
appeared in the experimental literature – in both economics and psychology (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 2000) – and some of it has to do with the well-known philosophical 
problems associated with ‘intentional’ or ‘folk psychological’ (belief-desire-action) 
explanations (Rosenberg, 1992). Although much of the impetus comes from critiques of 
rational choice theory, this does not mean that all of the resulting literature advocates 
doing away with it. Some authors clearly do, but others interpret these recent theoretical 
developments as a way of defending standard practice. In either case, whether its authors 
defend or attack rational choice theory, the literature embodies a fundamental change in 
the rules of engagement. It is too early to know how it will develop, or the various turns it 
might take along the way, but it is clear that both in its use of resources from other 
disciplines and in its overall mode of argumentation it has moved economics and 
philosophy in a substantially different direction. 
 The fourth area to consider overlaps substantially with previous section on minds, 
brains, cognitive science, and such. It concerns the tendency towards ‘naturalism’ in 
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epistemology and philosophy of science. The standard interpretation of both positivist 
and falsificationist philosophy of science puts ‘philosophy before science’ in the sense 
that philosophers first decide what scientists must do to produce theories that are 
cognitively significant – constitute legitimate scientific ‘knowledge’ – and then evaluate 
specific scientific practices on the basis of this philosophical analysis. Naturalism – and 
there are many specific versions, but here we consider its most generic form – reverses 
this relationship. Instead of starting with a priori philosophical analysis about what 
scientific knowledge must be, naturalism starts with science, that is, the best current 
scientific practice, and uses this best practice to inform our epistemological inquiries 
about knowledge in general. Much of the philosophical literature discussed in the 
previous section – the literature that employs contemporary cognitive science and 
neuroscience in the investigation of knowledge in general – is naturalist in this sense. 
Such naturalism raises a host of questions, particularly questions about how it is possible 
to have a ‘normative’ philosophy of science, one that explains what ought to be done in 
science, when the ‘philosophy’ in question is based on descriptions of scientific practice. 
Such questions are the subject of much current debate and do not have easy or simple 
answers. Fortunately, such answers are not required for a discussion of how naturalism 
has affected research in the philosophy of economics. 
 Much of the recent research in the history and philosophy of economics is broadly 
naturalist in spirit. Naturalism informs some of the work on traditional methodological 
questions (Hausman, 1992) as well as research in general philosophy of science that 
draws heavily on economics (Cartwright, 1989). It also provides the backdrop for a 
number of recent studies on specific research programmes within economics, including 
the role of models (Morgan, 1999; 2001), the practice of empirical macroeconomics 
(Hoover, 2001), and the development of experimental economics (Guala, 2005). 
Although the boundary that separates such naturalist-inspired research from similar work 
informed by science studies is somewhat blurred, it is often possible to categorize a 
particular piece of work as primarily one or the other. If the main question is the 
philosophical justification of the particular economic tool or theory – even if the 
standards for such justification are naturalistically or historically grounded – then the 
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research is in the spirit of naturalistic philosophy; but if the explanation of the acceptance 
or rejection of particular economic tools or theories is based primarily on the influence of 
social, political, or individual (non-epistemic) interests, then it falls more into science 
studies. 
 The final category of literature to be considered, the economics of scientific 
knowledge, reverses the standard relationship between a particular social science like 
economics and the philosophy of natural science. As discussed above, the traditional 
relationship between philosophy of science and economics has been that philosophy 
comes first (laying the foundations for knowledge), economic methodology then 
translates those philosophical ideas into the context of economic science, and finally 
particular economic theories are appraised on the basis of the methodological rules so 
acquired. In the economics of scientific knowledge this process is reversed. Certain areas 
of economic theory – for example, industrial organization (IO) economics  – examine 
how the institutional organization of a particular industry contributes to economic 
efficiency. Shifting this type of reasoning from the production of goods and services to 
the production of scientific knowledge is the basis for one way of thinking about the 
economics of scientific knowledge. The scientific community has a particular 
institutional structure; if the goal of this scientific ‘industry’ is the production of (reliable, 
justified, …) scientific knowledge, then an obvious question is the degree to which the 
industrial organization contributes to the growth of knowledge (that is, epistemic 
efficiency). Since the goal is the growth of knowledge within the community, it might be 
the case that all of the individual scientists following the same methodological rule may 
not be the optimal way to arrange the available epistemic resources; perhaps the greatest 
production of scientific knowledge comes about as the result of a ‘cognitive division of 
labor’ (Kitcher, 1993) rather than methodological homogeneity. It is easy to see how such 
an approach opens up new ways of thinking about the growth of scientific knowledge, 
and does so by employing economic theory as a resource (in the spirit of naturalism) to 
address general questions about the growth of knowledge and the optimal design of 
scientific institutions.  
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 It can be argued that such research on the economics of scientific knowledge goes 
back to Charles Sanders Peirce in 1879 (Wible, 1998), but regardless of its origins it has 
expanded rapidly during the last few years, with contributions coming from both 
economists and philosophers (Dasgupta and David, 1994; Goldman and Shaked, 1991; 
Kitcher, 1993; Wible, 1998). As one might expect, the literature has also generated a 
variety of critical responses (Hands, 1997; Mirowski, 2004). In addition, many other 
contributions to the economics of scientific knowledge are quite different from the 
version of epistemic IO discussed above (Mirowski and Sent, 2002). But in all of its 
various forms this work clearly represents a significant change in the interaction between 
economics and philosophy of science. 
 
Economics and moral philosophy 
One of the many changes that have taken place in the relationship between economics 
and moral philosophy has been a re-examination of economists’ traditional stance on the 
‘positive–normative dichotomy’. This change is sufficiently complex that it is examined 
in two parts. First, there has been a substantive reconsideration of the general place of 
‘the normative’ within the science of economics (where ‘normative’ does not necessarily 
concern ethics), and second, ethical norms are increasingly being considered in the causal 
explanation of economic phenomena.  
 Enforcing the prohibition against value judgements in economics requires 
maintaining a strict dichotomy between positive statements about what ‘is’ and normative 
statements about what ‘ought to be’. These two issues – dichotomization and prohibition 
– are certainly related, but they can also be separated. The first asserts that a dichotomy 
should be maintained – ‘ought’ should be kept separate (and cannot be derived) from ‘is’ 
– while the second asserts that separate is not equal – things on the normative/ought side 
of the dichotomy have no place within scientific economics. Although the first 
(dichotomy) is necessary for the second (prohibition), it is clearly not sufficient; one 
could argue, as, say, Mill and Marshall did, that there is a difference between positive and 




 Debate over the strict dichotomy and the prohibition against deriving ‘ought’ 
from ‘is’ has a long history. It was popularized by David Hume in the 18th century, 
labelled the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ by G. E. Moore early in the 20th century, and is the 
subject of a long and contentious debate within philosophy (Putnam, 2002). Although 
many economists have been concerned with these issues, the one who probably played 
the most important role in the profession’s ultimate establishment of the principle of strict 
separation was Lionel Robbins. Robbins (1952, p. 149) endorsed a strict dichotomy – 
‘Propositions involving the verb “ought” are different in kind from propositions 
involving the verb “is”’ – but he went beyond mere separation to prohibition, advocating 
complete exclusion of normative analysis from scientific economics. In particular, he 
criticized the normative welfare economics of the Marshallian school because it relied on 
‘interpersonal’ utility comparisons. For Robbins, the normative economics resulting from 
such analysis was ‘illegitimate’ and ‘lacking in scientific foundation’ (1952, p. 141).  
 By and large Robbins’s position on these matters has become the conventional 
wisdom among practising economists as well as among most contributors to the 
methodological literature. Where methodological commentators often differ is not over 
whether normative concerns should be kept out of scientific economics but rather on the 
factual question of whether most practising economists have actually done so. For 
example, well-known contributors to economic methodology, Mark Blaug (1980) and 
Milton Friedman (1953), both endorse the dichotomy and prohibition, but differ on the 
question of whether the economics profession has in fact been successful at keeping 
normative propositions out of its scientific practice. 
 The core of standard microeconomics continues to be rational choice theory; 
economic agents are assumed to have well-ordered preferences and make optimal choices 
given those preferences and the various constraints they face. Such rational choice 
explanations involve two parts: preferences (goals/ends) are assumed to be rational (that 
is, well-ordered, satisfying conditions such as transitivity and completeness) and the 
agent is presumed to act in the most efficient way to achieve those given ends (that is, to 
act in an instrumentally rational way). Philosophers have traditionally called such 
rationality ‘practical rationality’ to distinguish it from ‘theoretical’ or ‘epistemic’ 
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rationality. In general practical rationality involves what it is rational to do, or at least 
intend to do, while theoretical or epistemic rationality involves what it is rational to 
believe.  
 The literature on practical rationality leads to a very different characterization of 
the positive–normative dichotomy than the one standard in economics. Although most 
practising economists continue to view rational choice theory as a positive theory about 
the behaviour of economic agents (at least under ideal conditions), most philosophers 
writing on the subject consider it a normative theory in the sense that it involves norms 
and obligations. Practical rationality, and thus rational choice theory as a particular 
instantiation of it, is a normative theory because it tells agents what they ‘ought’ to do in 
order to act rationally. In the contemporary philosophical literature this view is often 
associated with the work of Donald Davidson (2001), but it has a long history and 
continues to be debated (Searle, 2001). Philosophers have certainly not closed the book 
on the question of how a theory of practical rationality could be a descriptive theory, or 
how, if it is normative, it might relate to associated descriptive theories. The point is 
simply that it is increasingly the case, in both philosophy and economics, that the 
discussion of rational choice theory starts from the presumption that it is a particular 
instantiation of the theory of normative rationality, and as a result, the description of 
actual economic agents – whether in the laboratory or in ‘the wild’ – is coming to be seen 
as something to be compared with, or reconciled with, this theory of normative 
rationality. It is still possible to discuss the ways in which rational choice theory is or is 
not an adequate scientific theory, but the starting point of the discussion has changed 
substantially (Hausman and McPherson, 2006; Mongin, 2006; Ross, 2005). 
 The second change to be examined requires us to step back from the previous 
discussion of normative rationality. Suppose we use ‘normative’ to mean ‘ethically 
normative’, and view rational choice theory as a strictly positive, not a normative, theory; 
then there are still a number of arguments for increasing the normative content of 
positive economic science. Although these arguments are less of a challenge to the 
conventional wisdom, they still constitute a potentially significant change in the 
relationship between economics and moral philosophy.  
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 Many of the arguments for increasing the (ethically) normative content of 
economic science come from the experimental literature, either experimental economics 
or experimental psychology. Researchers in these fields often reaches similar conclusions 
about the behaviour of the agents they study, although they differ regarding experimental 
protocols (particularly the role of cash payments) and how such results are to be 
interpreted (as a critique of rational choice theory or as a critique of the standard 
assumptions of rational choice theory). One of the systematic results of the literature has 
been that moral beliefs matter to decision making in experimental environments, and are 
sufficiently important that such morality often provides better empirical predictions than 
self-interested rational choice. For example, one of the earliest counter-intuitive 
experimental results was the tendency for individuals to over-contribute to (that is, not 
free ride on) public goods (Isaac, Walker and Thomas, 1984). One explanation for this 
over-contribution is an ethical ‘taste for fairness’. Another example involves the 
‘ultimatum game’, a game where a self-interested rational agent should offer the smallest 
possible amount to the other player. The experimental evidence indicates that individuals 
do not generally behave as rational choice theory suggests, but rather give the other 
player a more ‘fair’ distribution. Since rational choice theory allows for the possibility of 
‘moral’ (or otherwise non-self-interested) preferences, these results do not constitute a 
direct falsification of the core theory of rational choice (Guala, 2005), but they certainly 
do challenge profession’s traditional view of the positive and the normative. Instead of 
ethical norms interfering with the scientific investigation, these are cases where including 
ethical beliefs in the analysis improves the theory’s descriptive accuracy.  
 The next two developments shift attention away from the positive–normative 
dichotomy but still challenge key features of the view passed down from Robbins and the 
ordinal revolution. According to the standard history of demand/choice theory, three 
(good) things happened as the theory of consumer choice progressed from the hedonistic 
cardinalism of the late 19th century, through the ordinal revolution of the 1930s, and on 
to the revealed preference/consistency interpretation in contemporary textbooks. First, all 
vestiges of hedonistic psychology were finally abandoned; second, all interpersonal 
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comparisons of utility were eliminated; and finally, these changes brought about a steady 
improvement in the scientific foundations of the theory.  
 In recent years there has been serious reconsideration of at least two of these 
aspects of choice theory: hedonism and the impossibility of interpersonal utility 
comparisons. There have, of course, always been critics of the move away from 
hedonism and interpersonal utility comparisons (Harsanyi, 1955; Robertson, 1952), but 
the goal of such criticism has traditionally been to defend utilitarian ethics as the 
normative basis for economic policy. Appeals on such grounds certainly continue, but in 
recent years support for a return to hedonism and interpersonal utility comparisons has 
come from a number of new directions. Although these two topics are closely related, it 
is useful to discuss them separately.  
 Hedonism in rational choice theory is the idea that an agent’s preference for a 
particular bundle of goods is based on the psychological feeling of satisfaction the agent 
receives when the bundle is purchased or consumed. This is clearly the notion of utility 
present in 19th century utilitarianism, and, even though it has been replaced by a non-
hedonistic notion of preference in modern economics, it is still heard in casual 
conversation and in the classroom. One criticism of the move away from such 
psychological hedonism – a criticism from an earlier generation as well (Little, 1957; 
Robertson, 1952) – is that the move enervated the theory’s ability to provide any real 
explanation of observed behaviour. Although this criticism has been a theme in a number 
of important recent studies (Davis, 2003; Giocoli, 2003; Mandler, 1999), these authors do 
not generally recommend returning to a version of the earlier hedonist doctrine. On the 
other hand, some recent research does reach such neo-hedonist conclusions. 
 One research programme that endorses a return to hedonism is the work of the 
2002 Nobel Prize winner in economics, the experimental psychologist Daniel Kahneman 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 2000). Although the research of Kahneman and his associates is 
wide-ranging, and perhaps not every participant would support this particular aspect of 
the programme, the argument for a return to hedonism – what is called ‘experienced 
utility’ – has been a key aspect of Kahneman’s approach (Kahneman, 1994; 1999; 
Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin, 1997). There are two main parts to the argument for 
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experienced utility, one philosophical and the other based on recent changes in our 
scientific tools. The philosophical argument is simply that weakening the positivist grip 
on experimental practice has opened the door to a number of new and fruitful 
possibilities; the more practical argument is that new tools for measuring experienced 
utility are becoming, and will continue to become, more available over time. 
 
The methodological strictures against a hedonistic notion of utility are a 
relic of an earlier period in which a behavioristic philosophy of science 
held sway. Subjective states are now legitimate topic of study, and 
hedonic experiences such as pleasure, pain, satisfaction or discomfort are 
considered open to useful forms of measurement.  (Kahneman, 1994, p. 
20) 
 
 Paralleling such neo-hedonist arguments from experimental psychology are 
similar arguments from economics, particularly the literature endorsing ‘happiness 
research’ as a source of useful, and measurable, data for applied economic theory (Frey 
and Stutzer, 2002). Economists appear to be more willing than psychologists to accept 
measures of happiness based on survey data, but the hedonistic themes are very much the 
same. Finally, there is a literature on the relationship between economic rationality and 
evolutionary biology that also suggests a hedonistic characterization of utility is 
scientifically appropriate (Robson, 2001). It does not seem, as yet, that these newer 
interdisciplinary arguments defending hedonism have been integrated into the more 
traditional defence of utilitarian-based ethics as the basis for economic policy, but it is an 
obvious next step and is therefore extremely important for the relationship between 
economics and moral philosophy. 
 To turn from hedonism to a fourth change in the recent economics and ethics 
literature, there are similar (and often overlapping) arguments endorsing the revival of 
interpersonal utility comparisons in economics. Although the two issues – hedonism and 
interpersonal comparisons – are closely related, it is important to keep them separate. 
Hedonism is about feelings of pleasure and pain, and interpersonal comparisons are about 
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having a common unit of comparison between the preferences of different agents 
(Mandler, 1999). One can compare the current running through two different electrical 
appliances, but it is reasonable to conclude that such appliances do not ‘feel’ anything; 
similarly, two individuals could possess subjective, even cardinal, feelings about various 
goods and yet there would exist no way for a third party to measure or compare those 
feelings. 
 As in the case of hedonism, there have been consistent defenders of the legitimacy 
of interpersonal comparisons within economics, even when it was out of favour with 
most of the profession; many of these defenders came from the Marshallian tradition 
(Pigou, 1920), but that is not exclusively the case (Harsanyi, 1955; 1982). Often the 
argument was simply that economists should start with the observable facts of everyday 
life, and the fact is that humans make interpersonal comparisons all the time (Little, 
1957). Such defences continue, but in addition – again, as in the hedonism case – a 
number of new arguments are being made that draw on a range of interdisciplinary 
resources. 
 One source of evidence for interpersonal utility comparisons comes from recent 
research on neuroeconomics, part of the literature on ‘the mind, the brain, rationality, 
agency and economics’ discussed above. Neuroeconomics is a research programme that 
combines contemporary neuroscience and economics in the investigation of the micro-
foundations of decision making (Glimcher, 2003). Imaging studies from neuroeconomic 
research suggest that humans have the capacity to both represent the mental states of 
others and to empathize, that is, share the feelings of others. These abilities, it is argued, 
were selected for in human evolution because they ‘enable people to predict others’ 
behavior and, therefore, help them meet their individual goals’ (Singer and Fehr, 2005, p. 
343). Neuroeconomics is not the only source of such arguments for the reliability, and 
survivability, of interpersonal utility comparisons. Similar arguments have also been 
made in the literature on the philosophy of mind. For example Alvin Goldman (1995) 
combines a reliabilist approach to the philosophy of science with various arguments from 
cognitive psychology to make the case for individuals having the ability to mirror, or 
simulate, the mental states of others in a reliable way, including interpersonal utility 
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comparisons. In addition to the obvious support such research provides for moral 
theorizing within the utilitarian tradition, it also seems to provide a naturalistic 
explanation for the sympathy that played such an important role in Adam Smith’s moral 
theory. At the very least, moral, economic and cognitive theorizing are simply different 
parts of a single intellectual exercise – as they were for Smith and Mill – rather than 
being hermetically isolated, as they were for most of the 20th century.  
 The fifth and final research to examine carries us outside the boundaries of the 
previous topics. Whether one is considering rational choice theory as normative theory, 
using moral preferences to explain observed behaviour in experimental economics, or 
defending hedonistic psychology and interpersonal utility comparisons, the discussion 
continues to be broadly within the research programme that identifies welfare with the 
satisfaction (or feelings received from the satisfaction) of individual preferences. In all of 
these cases, regardless of how much the recent literature conflicts with the mainstream 
view on such matters, the bottom line is still that individuals have preferences (hedonistic 
or not) and the individual ‘good’ is to have those preferences satisfied. But not all moral 
and political philosophy, even all that involves economics, follows this tradition. 
 John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971) is arguably one of the most important 
books on moral philosophy of the 20th century; it, and the philosophical discussion 
surrounding it, set the stage for many of the changes discussed above. Although Rawls’s 
theory of justice falls squarely within the contractarian tradition – defining ‘justice’ as a 
property of the social contract that would emerge from the interaction of rational self-
interested agents – he imposed strong restrictions on the context in which such 
contractual bargaining takes place; the decisions must be made in ‘the original position’ 
behind a ‘veil of ignorance’. The principles of justice are those that would emerge from 
the bargaining of rational agents if those agents did not have any information about the 
position they would ultimately occupy (professional, class, gender, level of health, …) 
within the society governed by the contract, or even about what their preferences would 
be. Rawls goes on to argue for specific rules of justice that would emerge from such a 
context – including the much-debated ‘difference principle’ – but it is possible to separate 
his general approach to the question of justice from his specific distributional answers. 
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 Although it is impossible to discuss the extensive literature surrounding Rawls’s 
work in the space available here, it is important to consider the related contribution of one 
economist. The economist is Amartya Sen, the 1998 winner of the Nobel Prize in 
Economics. Sen has long been a critic of standard rational choice theory (Sen, 1977), but 
his critical writings have come to be overshadowed by his own capabilities approach to 
social welfare and related issues (Sen, 1985; 2002). The core idea of the capabilities 
approach to social welfare is to focus on the capabilities that people have, that is, on the 
things that people are effectively able to do or be – the functionings they are free to 
achieve – rather than on the satisfaction of individual preferences. Such capabilities are 
obviously multifaceted; they depend on the person’s mental and physical characteristics 
as well as his or her social context and opportunities. One may have the capability to ride 
a bike, to find meaningful work, to express oneself artistically, or to participate in the 
governance of one’s society; alternatively, one may have none, or only a few, of these 
capabilities. For Sen, such capabilities should be the proper focus for both the analysis of 
social welfare and the theory of economic development. The point of both welfare and 
development is to increase the capabilities of the population – to give them the freedom 
and opportunity to be better able to live the kind of life they find valuable. This, of 
course, does not rule out increasing the quantity of goods and services they have 
available, but it is at best only part of the story. In this sense Sen’s approach actually 
moves us farther away from the traditional preference-based notion of social welfare than 
Rawls. Rawls’s concept of justice is still based on the notion of a distribution of 
preference-satisfying goods (albeit primary social goods), while Sen shifts the focus away 
from individual preferences towards freedom and functioning. 
 Needless to say, Sen’s approach has many critics, but his work has also generated 
an extensive supporting, extending and implementing literature. An important example of 
support and extension is Martha Nussbaum’s (2000) research on women and 
development, which provides a specific list of the most important ‘central human 
capabilities’; an example of implementation is the United Nations Development 
Program’s Human Development Index, which builds on Sen’s capabilities approach. 
Undoubtedly the capabilities literature will continue to evolve, but, regardless of the 
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eventual shape it takes, it is an important contribution that has substantially changed the 
discourse on economics and moral philosophy.  
    
Convergences 
In closing, it is important to note the change that has taken place in the general way that 
various questions in philosophy and economics are approached in the recent literature 
compared with the way they were approached, at least by economists, for most of the 
20th century. The traditional view considered ‘the philosophical’, whether it be 
epistemology or ethics, as something ‘out there’ with respect to economics. In the case of 
epistemology it was appropriate to seek methodological advice from philosophers about 
the character and practice of science, but the border crossing remained sporadic and one-
way. In the case of ethics, the traditional view was simply to be aware of such ideas in 
order to prevent them from influencing the discipline’s scientific practice.  
 Things have indeed changed. This is not to say that there is any consensus about 
specifics in the contemporary literature on either economics–epistemology or economics–
ethics – in fact there has been an explosion of diversity and debate, and as such there is 
far less consensus on such matters than among economists in the past – but rather that the 
style of discussion has changed in both fields, and in a sense converged. Although a 
much longer list could be constructed, there seem to be three features of the debates in 
philosophy and economics discussed above that were effectively absent from the 
previous discussions: the interdisciplinarity, the naturalism, and the two-way relationship 
involved. The literatures discussed above all draw on a wide range of resources: 
economics and disciplinary philosophy certainly, but also cognitive psychology, 
neuroscience, the history and sociology of science, ideas from evolutionary biology, and 
a host of others.  They are also broadly naturalist in focus in the sense that the relevant 
philosophical questions – whether epistemological or ethical – are on equal footing with 
the science, social or natural, that is employed in, and constrains, the philosophical 
discussion. Finally, and perhaps most obviously, work in philosophy and economics is 
much more of a two-way street. It is not simply that a shelf of scientific philosophy is 
‘applied’ to economic methodology, or that a shelf of moral philosophy is used to cull 
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normative concepts from economic science, but rather that economic notions of agency, 
choice, efficiency and equilibrium now condition the discussions in philosophy in the 
same way that alternative philosophical ideas, and ‘normativity’ more broadly, are 
increasingly involved in discussions within economic theory. On the one hand, these are 
substantive changes; on the other hand, such interconnections were present in the work of 
Smith, Mill and others. Perhaps these changes in the relationship between philosophy and 
economics are not so new after all; perhaps what needs explanation is not recent 
developments but the aberration of the 20th century.      
 
D. Wade Hands 
 
See also conventionalism; epistemic foundations of solution concepts; ethics and 
economics; experimental economics (the science of economics); explanation; 
falsificationism; happiness, economics of; instrumentalism and operationalism; 
interpersonal utility comparisons (recent developments); Methodenstreit; methodology of 
economics; positivism; rational choice and philosophy; realism and ontology; social 
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